HSI for monitoring the critical safety functions status tree of a NPP by Oliveira, Mauro Vitor de et al.
2013 International Nuclear Atlantic Conference - INAC 2013 
Recife, PE, Brazil, November 24-29, 2013 
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR - ABEN 
ISBN: 978-85-99141-05-2 
 
HSI FOR MONITORING THE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS 
STATUS TREE OF A NPP 
 
Mauro Vitor de Oliveira, José Carlos Soares de Almeida, Silas Cordeiro Augusto and 
Guilherme Dutra Gonzaga Jaime 
 
Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN / CNEN – RJ) 
Rua Hélio de Almeida, 75 
21941-906 Rio de Janeiro, RJ 
mvitor@ien.gov.br, jcsa@ien.gov.br, silas@ien.gov.br, gdjaime@ien.gov.br 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Critical safety function (CSF) is the most significant design concept for prioritize operator actions based on the 
potential threat to the three barriers (fuel cladding, primary coolant system boundary, and containment) and allows 
the operator to respond to these threats prior to event diagnosis.  CSF has a hierarchical information structure that 
organizes the system variables affecting the plant safety in terms of goal-means relations.  It is important that the 
operator should be aware of various success paths associated with each CSF in order to respond to unanticipated 
system failures quickly.  When an emergency occurs in NPPs, the operator should monitor CSFs periodically and 
identify possible success paths as necessary, and try to stabilize or safely shut down the plant using emergency 
operating procedure (EOP) that includes steps to check the CSFs.  This implies that safety function status check 
may become a cognitively burdensome task that needs to be supported by proper information display.  The 
advanced human-system interface (HSI) in nuclear power plants provides an information environment that 
supports the operators’ burdensome cognitive tasks.  This paper describes a CSFs interface design for supporting 
the operator’s tasks to monitor and identify the associated success path for Westinghouse 3-loops NPP. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, emergency operating procedures (EOPs) 
have been viewed as the next line of defense, after plant design, in preventing or mitigating 
core damage as a result of unplanned transients.  The current industry trend for these 
procedures incorporates a symptom-based approach (also known as a state-based approach) 
where operator actions result from the monitoring of plant symptoms rather than from 
specific identified events (i.e. the operator responds to the symptom of loss of primary 
inventory as opposed to the specific event of a loss of coolant accident).  The procedures may 
be formatted as flowcharts or dual-column, but all the symptom-based procedures prioritize 
operator actions based on the potential threat to the three barriers (fuel cladding, primary 
coolant system boundary, and containment) and allows the operator to respond to these 
threats prior to event diagnosis.  The procedures also offer alternative actions should the 
primary action fail.  The event-based approach relies on the operators’ expertise to diagnose 
the event and chose the procedure designed to mitigate that specific event, and in most cases, 
places a tremendous amount of stress on the operator to make the correct diagnosis. 
 
The fundamental goal of nuclear safety is the prevention of uncontrolled release of 
radioactive materials from nuclear power plant and ensuring that physical barriers remain 
intact always and under all conditions that may exist.  Emergence Operating Procedures 
(EOP) was introduced to assist the operator to perform actions necessary to mitigate the 
consequences of transients and accidents.  EOP provides a set of predefined and prioritized 
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response strategies that guides the operator in management of emergency transient.  The 
strategies are derived from the Optimal Recovery and Critical Safety Function Restoration 
concepts.  Using the safety function concept, the individual procedures of operator actions 
during an event can be standardized [1] with separate operator diagnostic and control 
elements.  Critical Safety Functions (CSFs) are set of safety function for diagnostic the plant 
safety state and they are part of EOP.  Their structure is very suitable for programming. 
 
Salamum et al. [2] have developed a conceptual idea of implementing CSF in computerized 
emergency procedures.  Kim et al. [3] have developed a computer interface for monitoring 
and recovering nine CSFs for Korean next generation reactor (KNGR).  The purpose of this 
work is to design a CSFs interface for supporting the operator’s tasks to monitor and identify 
the associated success path for Westinghouse 3-loops NPP. 
 
 
2. NPP OPERATING PROCEDURES 
 
To control an extremely complex system such as a NPP it is mandatory to follow some 
operating procedures.  In normal situation, operators in a NPP operate the plant according to 
the systems operating procedures (SOPs) and the general operating procedures (GOPs).  Note 
that when speaking of the whole plant, the term plant operating mode (POM) is commonly 
used instead of the term plant operational state (POS), which is more often found in 
probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) studies.  Figure 1 presents the plant operation modes of 
the reference NPP in normal situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  The operation modes of the reference NPP in normal situation. 
 
 
When an alarm occurs, the operators monitor necessary signals and manipulate appropriate 
devices through the alarm recovery procedure (ARP).  When multiple alarms occur, the 
operators act through the abnormal operating procedure (AOP).  If the reactor is tripped 
and/or safety injection (SI) is operated in an abnormal state, the operators monitor necessary 
signals and manipulate necessary devices to put the NPP in a hot standby (HSB) state through 
the emergency operating procedure (EOP).  Figure 2 presents the mapping of plant state and 
correspondent operating procedures for NPPs. 
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Figure 2:  Procedure analysis. 
 
 
The EOP outlines the procedures for emergency situations such as loss of coolant accident 
(LOCA) or steam generator tube rupture (SGTR).  If the reactor is tripped or SI begins, 
operators should operate the plant according to the E-0 procedure.  The E-1 procedure is for 
LOCA, and the E-2, E-3 procedures are for SGTR. 
 
The EOP consists of ‘‘If-then-else’’ statements and the types of statements are classified into 
four categories.  The first types are statements that require checking the values or states of 
devices.  The second types are control statements that require manipulating devices such as 
valves.  The third type are ambiguous statements which consist of vague and ambiguous 
information such as ‘‘increase’’, ‘‘decrease’’, and ‘‘keep’’.  The last types are statements that 
require supplementary data.  Table 1 presents some steps of E-0 procedure with emphasis to 
the link for the CSFs procedure, on step 26. 
 
 
Table 1.  Some steps of EOP E-0 procedure. 
 
Step Action/Expected Response Response not Obtained 
          Note 
          Steps 1 to 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps 
1 Confirm reactor trip: 
Reactor trip light LIT 
Rod position indicators at ZERO 
Neutron flux DECREASING  
Manually trip reactor. If reactor not trip, 
then go to ATWS. 
2 Confirm turbine trip 
All turbine stop valves CLOSED 
Manually trip turbine. 
• 
• 
• 
 • 
• 
• 
26 Initiate monitoring of the critical safety 
functions status trees 
 
• 
• 
• 
 
 
 
• 
• 
• 
36 Return to step 19 (reactor coolant system 
temperature) 
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Note that in the step 26 of the EOP E-0 the operators should verify the conditions of the plant 
critical safety function status. 
 
2.1.  Emergency Operating Procedures Approaches 
 
It is expected that emergency operating procedures meet the following minimum 
requirements and approaches to cope with plant events [4]. 
 
2.1.1.  General requirements 
 
It is expected that emergency conditions shall be identified and procedures for dealing them 
prepared for use when required.  Since emergencies may not follow anticipated patterns, the 
procedures should provide for sufficient flexibility of actions to accommodate variations, 
including multiple and sequential failures.  Then, the objective of emergency procedures is to 
return the plant to a condition covered by normal procedures or to provide for a safe extended 
and stable shutdown condition. 
 
2.1.2.  Event-based approach 
 
For event based procedures, the decisions and measures to cope with events are made with 
respect to the state of the plant related to predefined events, which are considered in the 
design of the plant.  The operator must identify the specific design-based accident before the 
recovery/mitigating operator actions are begun. 
 
Some advantages of this approach are: procedures are easier of develop and maintain; if 
events follow the expected/analyzed scenario, the recovery/mitigating operator actions are 
more straight forward, easier to perform, more efficient, less time consuming, and are 
optimized for the specific analyzed condition; and in case of a prompt and proper operator 
diagnosis, the event-based approach allows for the direct access to the predefined operator 
action, and by performance of these prompt actions, may prevent a more serious propagation 
of the emergency situation. 
 
Limitations of this approach are: operators may be subject to unexpected events and thus be 
in situations for which they have had no specific training or procedures.  Event-based 
operator recovery/mitigating actions are limited to predetermined/predefined accident 
scenarios.  With this approach there is no method to deviate for the unexpected, which is 
typical of an accident scenario; and there are no links or transition points between different 
procedures.  Therefore, there is no method for the operator to deal with multiple events (i.e. 
steam line break/LOCA, loss of feedwater/ATWS, etc.). 
 
2.1.3.  Symptom-based approach 
 
The decisions for measures to cope with events are made with respect to the symptoms and 
the state of systems of the plant (e.g. values of safety parameters, critical safety functions).  
There is no need to identify the specific ongoing type of event before recovery/mitigating 
operator actions are begun. 
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Advantage of this approach is symptom-based procedures resolve many of the limitations of 
the event-based approach by formally defining and prioritizing the major critical safety 
functions, the symptom based approach follows the natural human (operator) tendency to 
want to keep the operating systems' safety parameters within an accepted safe operational 
band.  This allows for the operator to maintain optimal operating characteristics without 
being concerned about the ongoing accident scenario. 
 
Limitations of this approach are: symptom-based procedures are more labor intensive to 
develop and maintain, require more technical analysis, and require a different operator 
training approach.  Thereby, they become more expensive to implement; and there is greater 
dependence on operator actions, and a need to develop alternate operator actions to facilitate 
recovery should the primary methods fail. 
 
2.1.4.  Developed HSI approach 
 
In this work, we use the symptom-based approach for develop the CSF interface.  Figure 3 
shows the relationship between the emergency response guidelines (ERGs) (the emergency 
procedures) used to drive the operators to the optimal recovery guideline (ORG) for the plant 
and the check of the CSFs.  The operators must identify/correct the event-related part to the 
transient/accident and at same time continuously monitor the status of the CSFs.  And, in case 
of a not satisfied CSF (the event-independent part) they have to execute the function 
restoration guideline (FRG) of the violated CSF.  The operators must jump between two 
different procedures that may cause extra cognitive workload. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  ERGs and CSFs operator response pattern. 
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3.  CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS CONCEPTS 
 
The accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant in March 1979 showed 
several problems in management of emergencies and information sources for the personnel 
and authorities.  As a response, several facilities and systems have been taken into use since 
then.  One of them, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) provides information of 
plant parameters from which the safety status of the operation may be assessed in the control 
room.  After the initial and general concept of SPDS more advanced implementation have 
emerged.  For example, the Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS), based on the 
concepts of critical safety functions and success paths, was developed by Combustion 
Engineering Inc. 
 
Critical safety function prioritize operator actions based on the potential threat to the three 
barriers (fuel cladding, primary coolant system boundary, and containment) and allows the 
operator to respond to these threats prior to event diagnosis.  CSF has a hierarchical 
information structure that organizes the system variables affecting the plant safety in terms of 
goal-means relations.  It is important that the operator should be aware of various success 
paths associated with each CSF in order to respond to unanticipated system failures quickly.  
When an emergency occurs in NPPs, the operator should monitor CSFs periodically and 
identify possible success paths as necessary, and try to stabilize or safely shut down the plant 
using emergency operating procedure (EOP) that includes steps to check the CSFs.  This 
implies that safety function status check may become a cognitively burdensome task that 
needs to be supported by proper information display.  The advanced HSI in NPPs provides an 
information environment that supports the operators’ burdensome cognitive tasks. 
 
3.1.  Critical Safety Functions 
 
Six critical safety functions were identified for the reference plant and they were 
implemented in the HSI of the simulator interface to support the operator’s tasks to monitor 
and identify the associated success path for Westinghouse 3-loops NPP.  In order of priority, 
they are: 
1. Subcriticality (SC) 
2. Core cooling (CC) 
3. Heat sink (HS) 
4. Reactor Coolant System Integrity (RI) 
5. Containment Environment (CE) 
6. Reactor Coolant Inventory (CI) 
 
The purpose of the subcriticality safety function is to provide an indication of the shutdown 
status of the reactor.  The core cooling critical safety function provides an indication of 
whether or not the reactor core is being adequately cooled.  The heat sink critical safety 
function is related to the capacity of the residual heat removal system, and in the region 
where they are effective, the steam generators including their dump systems, to absorb the 
heat generated by the reactor.  The reactor coolant system integrity safety function determines 
whether the pressure in the reactor coolant system, as measured at the pressurizer, is within 
specified limits based upon coolant temperature and rate of change of coolant temperature.  
The containment environment critical safety function provides an evaluation of the potential 
for a radiation leak from the containment surrounding the reactor vessel.  Finally, the reactor 
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coolant inventory, by monitoring the coolant levels in the pressurizer and the reactor vessel 
upper head, provides information useful in determining if the quantity of water present in the 
primary system is satisfactory and/or if a bubble has formed in the reactor vessel head. 
 
It was said before that CSF status trees must be continuously monitored during an abnormal 
condition.  CSFs can be classified in four categories: 
• existing hazardous condition (HIGH condition); 
• potentially dangerous condition (MEDIUM condition); 
• off-normal condition (LOW condition); 
• normal condition (SATISFIED condition). 
 
 
4. CFST HUMAM-SYSTEM INTERFACE 
 
The advanced human-system interface (HSI) in nuclear power plants provides an information 
environment that supports the operators’ burdensome cognitive tasks.  Safety function status 
check (SFSC), one of such tasks, can benefit from well designed information interface. 
 
The interface consists of three hierarchical levels of information: the goal tree including all 
safety functions, flow structure of the success path, and the link to the correspondent function 
restoration guideline related to the success path. 
 
A Senior Reactor Operator implementing emergency procedures must keep track of multiple 
events simultaneously.  He/she must remember various other component states and process 
parameter conditions necessary for transient recovery.  And, most importantly, he/she must 
continually monitor the overall safety status of the plant.  Thus, although current emergency 
procedures are very comprehensive, the price exacted is increased complexity in that the 
human being must be aware of the plant on several levels concurrently. 
 
Figure 4 presents an overview of the simulator control room of the Human-System Interface 
Laboratory (LABIHS), where each operator is monitoring the CSF screens.  Figure 5 presents 
the main operation screen of the LABIHS simulator [5], with the navigator buttons to all the 
systems to operate the plant.  It was included in this screen a navigator button to the critical 
safety function status tree, at the middle bottom of the screen.  Clicking on this button the 
system will open the CFST main screen. 
 
The CFST main screen is showed in Figure 6.  This screen shows at upper left side the entry 
conditions (reactor trip and/or safety injection actuated) to the CFST monitoring system.  The 
six CSFs are presented on this screen with the correspondent status of each one, i.e., the 
priority degree of each CSF.  The priority degree of the CSFs is divided in four categories or 
severity degrees (SATISFIED, LOW, MEDIUN and RIGH).  The SATISFIED condition is 
lit (green color) when the CSF has no potential dangerous to the plant safety.  The LOW 
condition is lit (yellow color) when the CSF has little potential dangerous to the plant safety, 
i.e., it is a warning to the operators about of an off-normal condition in the plant safety.  The 
MEDIUM condition is lit (purple color) when plant is in a potentially dangerous condition.  
The HIGH condition is lit (red color) when exist hazardous condition to the plant safety.  The 
priority level is lit with the highest condition of all CSFs.  The navigation buttons to each 
CFST is show at the bottom left side of the screen.  Clicking on CSF navigation buttons the 
system will open the correspondent status tree of the selected critical function.  All the CSFs 
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screens were developed based on NUREG-0700 [6] using iLog Studio [7] and the tree logic 
was implemented in C language. 
 
Figure 7 shows the CFST for the containment environment with the violated critical function, 
the increase of containment radiation.  The correspondent functional restoration for this 
critical function is lit (FRCE-3 is lit in yellow color).  Clicking on this box the operator can 
see, in a popup screen, the major actions to be done in order to restore the critical function.  
Table 2 shows the functional restoration (FR) procedures for recovery any violation in the 
critical safety function status tree. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Overview of the LABIHS simulator control room. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Main menu of the NPP simulator. 
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Figure 6:  CFST main screen with containment environment violation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  CFST containment environment violation and major restoration actions. 
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Table 2.  Recovery procedures used in CSFs violation. 
 
CSF Functional 
restoration 
Recovery procedure 
FRSC-1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS Subcriticality FRSC-2 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown 
 FRCC-1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling 
Core Cooling FRCC-2 Response to  Degraded Core Cooling 
 FRCC-3 Response to Saturated Core Cooling 
 FRHS-1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 
 FRHS-2 Response to Steam Generator Overpressure 
Heat Sink FRHS-3 Response to Steam Generator High Level 
 FRHS-4 Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities 
 FRHS-5 Response to Steam Generator Low Level 
FRRI-1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition RCS Integrity FRRI-2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition 
 FRCE-1 Response to High Containment Pressure 
CTMT Environment FRCE-2 Response to Containment Flooding 
 FRCE-3 Response to High Containment Radiation Level 
 FRCI-1 Response to High Pressurizer Level 
Coolant Inventory FRCI-2 Response to Low Pressurizer Level 
 FRCI-3 Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel 
 
 
5. CSF INTERFACE EVALUATION 
 
In LABIHS simulator, there are six CSFs: Subcriticality (reactivity control), Core cooling 
(core heat removal), Heat sink (RCS heat removal), RCS integrity (thermal shock), 
Containment environment (containment pressure, sump water level, and radiation), and 
Coolant inventory (RCS inventory).  Each CSF has several means, called success paths, to 
achieve its goal related to the plant safety.  For instance, Subcriticality can be achieved by 
inserting control rods or by injecting poison.  The latter can be done in several methods for 
increasing boron concentration.  During emergent situations, the operator should monitor the 
CSFs periodically, and identify possible success paths as necessary.  This safety function 
status check (SFSC) task can be facilitated by a well-designed interface. 
 
As we can see in Table 2, some examples of events causing entrance into a CSF are: 
 ad CSF Subcriticality: ATWS, loss of core shutdown; 
 ad CSF Core Cooling: inadequate, saturated, degraded core cooling; 
 ad CSF Heat Sink: steam generator high level, low level, overpressure; 
 ad CSF RCS Integrity: pressurized thermal shock, cold overpressure; 
 ad CSF CTMT Environment: containment overpressure, flooding, high radiation; 
 ad CSF Coolant Inventory: high and low pressurizer level, voids in reactor vessel. 
 
For test the developed CSFs interface we introduce two different types of accidents in the 
plant simulator.  The first was a rupture of 50 cm2 in the cold leg 2 of the reactor coolant 
system, located before the correspondent reactor coolant pump.  In this case, the rupture will 
cause a leak of water from the primary loop to the containment environment.  Considering 
that the primary water has some radiation contamination this leak will produce an increase in 
INAC 2013, Recife, PE, Brazil. 
 
the radiation level in the containment.  The identification of the CSF violated is showed in 
Figure 6 and the major actions to control this off-normal condition are showed in Figure 7, 
thorough the critical safety function restoration guidelines which are suitable for given 
conditions. 
 
The second tested accident was a steam generator tube rupture accident.  It was select a 
rupture of 10 cm2 in the steam generator 3 of the simulator NPP.  This accident will produce 
a leak of water from the primary circuit to the secondary circuit thorough the steam generator.  
This will cause an increase of pressure in the secondary system, and a loss of cooling 
inventory.  The identification of the CSFs violated is showed in Figure 8 and the major 
actions to control the off-normal condition for the coolant inventory are showed in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  CSFs heat sink and coolant inventory violation. 
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Figure 9:  CSF coolant inventory violation and major restoration actions. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Critical safety function status check is a burdensome task demanding an efficient support 
because it requires operators to monitor the critical safety functions and their success paths 
continuously.  In this work we present an interface design to monitor the critical safety 
function of the LABIHS simulator.  The developed interface was based on symptom-based 
approach to monitor six CSFs of the plant simulator.  The CSF interface was divided in three 
levels of information.  In the first level the operators have an overview of the state of each 
CSF and the correspondent’s functional restoration guidelines to be used in each case.  An 
indication of the critical function to be treated as a matter of priority is also given in this 
level.  The second level shows the status tree of the selected critical function.  In this level the 
operators have information about the values of all variables involved in the decision tree, and 
they do not need to navigate to other plant screens to access the variables values.  Also in this 
level the interface shows what functional restoration guideline should be used to restore the 
plant.  This third level is given in a popup screen with the main actions to be done by the 
operators to leave the plant into a safety condition. 
 
The designed interface is been evaluated thorough a series of experiments typically using 
emergency scenarios such as, Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA), Steam Generator Tube 
Rupture (SGTR) etc.  Experimental results will be used to identify design deficiencies and 
develop solutions to improve the proposed interface. 
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